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Chapter 12

Disparate Savings Propensities and
National Retirement Policy
Richard A. Ippolito

In this chapter, I consider an underlying theme that is implicit in much of
the discussion of national retirement policy- the disinclination of some
individuals to save for retirement. Put differently, if all individuals had
sufficient foresight and self-control to save for their own retirement periods, the need for a national retirement policy would be minimal. If some
individuals do not save, however, they are destined to be impoverished in
old age, a result that poses an important problem for society. In this
chapter, I touch on some of the principles of 401 (k) plans, which is the
main focus of several other chapters in the volume, but my main thrust is
to explore why the tax treatment of savings is important, both to national
income and consumption levels during old age.
In this context, the drift away from defined benefit plans portends
a growing old age problem. Historically, most pension coverage took
the form of defined benefit pensions. In these plans, typically, covered
workers have no choice but to earn accruals in the pension. Furthermore, these plans typically pay benefits in the form of annuities, diminishing the chances that recipients can spend down assets prior to their
old age. In 401 (k) plans, however, even if the firm offers workers the
opportunity to participate in the plan, and though it may offer some
substantial rewards for their participation (in the form of matching employee contributions), a significant portion ofworkers will not contribute
to the pension. And these plans typically pay benefits in the form oflump
sums, increasing the chances that some recipients will spend their pension monies long before they become old.
In reality, firms are not motivated to be inclusive in their pension
coverage, and may have incentives to exclude workers from pensions who
otherwise do not care to participate. These incentives are magnified if
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the qualities of being a "spender" are correlated with attributes that
make a lower-{J.ualityworker.
The trend toward 401 (k) plans redoubles the need for a national retirement policy that encourages participation by all individuals in some
kind of savings arrangement for old age. [ do not provide specific policy
recommendations. except for the sake of illustration. Rather. I concentrate on the principles that characterize an efficient solution to the "nonsaver problem."

The Nature of the Problem
[ start by separating the population into two groups. low discounters and
high discounters. High discounters downplay the future. They prefer
immediate gratification. Low discounters attach more value to future
outcomes and thus are more likely to choose options with long-term
payoffs. If two otherwise identical people are offered $100 today or $100
+ x one year in the future. the "high discounter" requires a higher value
of xto choose the delayed payment compared to a "low discounter.") The
differences in internal discount rates across the population can have
some profound effects on the well-being of a society.
Low discounters. while young. anticipate their standard ofliving when
they reach old age and thus save sufficient amounts to support old age
consumption. High discounters attach less importance to their economic
condition far in the future and thus are inclined to devote their earnings
to support higher current consumption. Other things being the same.
low discounters have high savings propensities; high discounters have low
savings propensities. 2
A conflict is predictable. High discounters will be impoverished in old
age, and low discounters will be wealthy. As long as society supports old
age consumption at some reasonable level, it is rational for low discounters to anticipate the need to "share" their retirement savings with high
discounters. This prospect is akin to a tax on savings that diminishes low
discounters' incentive to accumulate wealth for retirement.
As a general proposition, high discounters naturally gravitate toward
firms that award compensation immediately, and thus tend to avoid pension firms. Unless information is perfect and workers have job choices
among a large number of alternatives, however, some high discounters
enter firms that offer pensions, creating incidental pension coverage of
some high discounters.
To the extent that incidental coverage has characterized the pension
market, it is expected to wane owing to the growing share of pension
coverage by defined contribution plans (Gustman and Steinmeier 1992).
These plans embody incentives to encourage high discounters to volun-
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tarily quit pension firms and/or permit them to voluntarily exclude
themselves from 401 (k) savings (Ippolito 1998). These outcomes may be
desirable from the perspective of firms trying to maximize productivity
and of high discounters trying to maximize the present value of their own
welfare. In the long run, however, the systemic exclusion of high discounters from pension coverage wiIl lead to a growing portion of the
population that saves "too little" for their retirement.
As long as high discounters can vote in democratic elections, and governments have the power to redistribute income, high discounters' disinclination to save poses a potential economic burden on low discounters
in the long run. Unless public policies (which themselves are influenced
by a democratic vote) can resolve the natural conflict between high and
low discounters, the result can degenerate to an equilibrium characterized by a lower standard of living for high and low discounters, particularly in old age.
I first consider the high discounter from the corporate perspective and
show that firms, individually, have little incentive to include high discounters in pension plans. I then consider the problem from the public
perspective. Here, I consider how low discounters as a group can solve
the high discounter problem without importantly reducing output and
savings in the economy. The general idea is that instead of accepting the
prospects of a tax on their own wealth when old, low discounters are
better off subsidizing high discounters' savings, thereby diminishing
high discounters' incentive to hold up low discounters when they reach
old age.

The Corporate Perspective
Discount Rates and Worker Quality
Managers operate firms to maximize returns for investors. Unless pensions can increase the firm's market value, for example, by increasing
labor productivity or reducing turnover and the like,3 each firm individually has no stake in its workers' savings behavior, including their pension
participation. Firms, however, may have an economic interest in workers'
underlying internal discount rates. Ifworkers greatly discount the future,
they may be inclined to behave in the workplace in ways that reduce
productivity. In this sense, firms may have an interest in workers' overt
savings behavior because it is a signal of workers' underlying internal
discount rates.'
It is natural to think that individuals with low discount rates are more
productive. Just as low discounters attach more value to the long-term
benefits of financial savings, so do they attach more value to investments
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in their human capital. These investments reveal themselves in a large
array of decisions - including many workplace decisions. The behavior
of individuals with low discount rates is influenced by the long-term implications of their current work performance.
For example, low discounters are less likely to take a day off on a whim
or quit in a "huff," instead valuing the long-term implications of their
reputation for reliability and thus economizing on firms' expenditures
on duplication and hiring. They are less likely to mistreat machines and
equipment, because they recognize the long-term benefit of being labeled a "low-eost" employee. They are less likely to value the short-term
gains from shirking over the long-term consequences of getting caught
and are more likely to be motivated to work hard to gain the benefits
of promotions. In all these ways, low discounters economize on firms'
monitoring costs.
In contrast, high discounters are influenced disproportionately by
benefits realized in the short term. The firm either must expend resources to discipline their behavior or accept the implications of high
discounters' short-term perspective. In either case, high discounters are
less valuable as workers compared with low discounters. 5
If values of marginal product are importantly related to internal discount rates, competition will drive firms to identifY low discounters. The
identification, however, is not trivially accomplished because information in the labor market is imperfect. While firms can observe some
telltale signs of job applicants' discount rates, notably education attainment or other training, much of the variation in internal discount rates is
unobservable. 6
Firms do not all attach the same value to employing low discounters.
Firms that can monitor output cheaply, and/ or do not face significant
costs from absenteeism, quitting, and the like, will offer compensation
schemes more attractive to high discounters. Firms that attach higher
value to employing low discounters will use compensation packages that
put more emphasis on deferred pay. The competitive process ensures
that low discounters receive compensation commensurate with their
higher value of marginal product. But their compensation must be reduced by the costs incurred by firms to identifY low discounters. Firms
that find the most efficient mechanisms to sort low discounters attract a
higher-quality work force and earn higher profits.
Presumably, ifit expends sufficient monitoring resources, the firm can
align pay and productivity across the spectrum of discount rates characterizing workers in its employ. I consider a more interesting issue:
whether the firm can find efficient sorting devices that allocate high and
low discounters to their best uses without incurring monitoring costs.
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More specifically, I pursue one part of the compensation package that is
naturally suited to low discounters, namely, the pension plan.

Selecting in Low Discounters
If information is perfect and workers can choose jobs from a large array
of compensation packages, high discounters will not take jobs in firms
that offer pensions. When job search is costly, some high discounters
inadvertently enter pension firms.
The problem of workers entering the "wrong" firm is not easily dismissed because it is endemic to workers with high discount rates. Job
shopping is inherently an investment activity. Search costs incurred early
in the career result in the long-term benefits of finding the "right" job.
Low discounters should thus invest more in the search process and have a
greater likelihood of selecting a firm that values their long-term outlook
(Lippman and McCall 1976). High discounters presumably are less careful job shoppers and thus more frequently take jobs at firms with production functions designed for low discounters.
The entry of some high discounters poses a problem for firms designed for low discounters. The firm can address the high discounter
problem in several ways. It can accept the inefficiency of having some
high discounters in the firm, or incur monitoring costs to identify high
discounters and transactions costs to fire them, or erect a mechanism to
encourage high discounters to leave the firm voluntarily early in their
tenure. Plain defined contribution plans are ideally suited to perform
the sorting out function.

Sorting Out High Discounters: Defined Contribution Plans
Consider a defined contribution plan in its simplest form. The firm contributes a fixed percentage of pay, denoted by s, into each worker's account. Vesting is immediate.? Upon quitting, the worker takes a lump
sum (it is eligible for rollover into an individual retirement account8 );
otherwise, he has no access to his account.
Suppose that workers have identical attributes except for their internal
discount rates, and that these rates have a dichotomous distribution. Low
discounters have zero discount rates and a desired savings rate, s. High
discounters have an infinite discount rate, and a zero desired savings rate.
Assume that firms know the overall proportions of high and low discounters in the labor market, but do not know individual workers' discount rates. They simply hire all workers who apply for ajob and rely on
sorting devices to influence the composition of their workforces. Workers
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know their own discount rates, but have imperfect information about the
labor market.
The firm wants to employ low discounters because they economize on
monitoring costs." Owing to their lackluster job search, some high discounters enter the no-monitoring firm. [ characterize their gain from
entering as j" which is positive for some high discounters. 'o

The Economics of Quitting a Defined-Contribution Firm
Consider the efficacy of a defined contribution pension in correcting
hiring errors. At the end of period 1, workers make a decision whether to
quit the firm. Assuming they have the same knowledge of the labor marketas they did at the beginning of period 1, the economics ofjoining and
staying are the same, with one important difference. Upon quitting,
workers obtain the lump sum amount s after period 1: If they stay, 5 is
payable in some future period. For low discounters, the value of s is the
same whether or not it remains in the pension plan, and thus the gains
from staying are the same as for joining. For high discounters, the perceived net gains from staying, g", are lower by the added value of obtaining the available pension amount immediately: gIl =j" - 5.
An economic function for defined contribution plans emerges. The
lump sum they provide upon quitting encourages high discounters to
select themselves for early departure from the firm. In effect, the plan
continually sifts the workforce for high discounters; thereby improving
the composition of the firm's workforce over time. High discounters
with the smallest values of j" quit after period I. At the end of the next
period, the available lump sum is 25, and after the third period, 35, and
so on. Gradually, most of the high discounters find it economic to depart
the firm.

Paying Less to High Discounters: 40 I (k) Plans
In plain defined contribution plans, the firm periodically contributes a
fixed amount, often a percentage of pay, to each worker's account. In
401 (k) versions of these plans, the firm might make an unconditional
contribution. More often, workers choose some voluntary savings rate in
the plan, and the firm often matches these contributions on an m-to-one
basis. It is easy to understand the appeal of voluntary contributions in
these plans: they facilitate a more efficient pattern of savings across
workers. Explaining the matching mechanism is more problematic.
An oft-cited candidate to explain matching is the Internal Revenue
Code. The Code specifies "discrimination rules" that regulate the size of
contributions of higher-paid workers to the 401 (k) plan compared to
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lower-paid workers. In this explanation, matching elicits more contributions from lower-paid workers, which permits more tax-favored contributions by higher-paid workers. I have shown elsewhere, however, that
matching generates potential tax benefits that are inconsequentially
small, and impose costs on the firm by misaligning wages and values of
marginal product across its workforce (Ippolito 1998).
One could alternatively postulate that firms have a stake in the timely
retirement of older workers. Even if they do not use defined benefit
plans, presumably firms would attain earlier retirement patterns if its
workers had access to funds sufficient to finance their earlier retirement.
In this sense, the match could be interpreted as an incentive to encourage more pension savings in its workforce. But if this goal were important,
the firm could use a simple defined contribution plan, thereby requiring
some pension savings for all workers.
The economics of matching is captured by a simple observation: Firms
pay a premium to workers solely on the basis of their decisions to contribute to 401 (k) plans. In the context of a sorting theory, a 401 (k) plan with
matching encourages workers to align their pay and productivity without
imposing monitoring costs on the firm. Instead of encouraging high
discounters to depart, 401 (k) matching schemes simply pay high discounters less than low discounters.
The pay difference is not necessarily limited to the match amounts.
Once the firm infers workers' internal discount rates from observing
401 (k) contribution rates, it can use this information in selecting workers
for more important jobs. In this way, the implications of sorting go beyond the wage differences established from the matching amounts.

Summary
Firms ought to be indifferent to pension participation unless it affects
their market value. Ifpremature quitting and late retirement ages reduce
productivity in the firm, pension participation (especially in defined benefit plans) adds value to the firm. If firms use production functions designed for low discounters, but are not necessarily concerned with long
tenure, firms may have incentives to effectively exclude high discounters
from pension savings vehicles, particularly in 401 (k) plans. In this sense,
the growth of defined contribution plans in place of defined benefit
plans suggests lower pension coverage rates for high discounters.
If pensions do not affect performance, the only reason firms offer
pensions is to confer tax advantages to workers. l l In a pure tax model,
firms are disinterested savings agents. Firms individually have no inherent interest in their workers' living standard during their retirement.
Similarly, low discounters individually have no stake in programs that
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force high discounters to engage in long-term savings. Each low discounter wants flexibility to attain his desired pension savings even if it
means zero participation by high discounters.
From a broader perspective, firms as a whole - as corporate taxpayers-and low discounters as a whole-as income tax payers-have a
stake in the savings behavior of high discounters. If high discounters do
not save for retirement then, as long as society provides public monies to
support high discounters' retirement, taxpayers face the prospects of
transferring part of their wealth to finance high discounters' retirement
consumption. It is inevitable that, in a free market, high discounters will
pose problems for society in their old age. In this sense, there is a need
for some public savings mechanism that is inclusive; otherwise, the incentives for low discounters to save may also wane, as I will show below.
In the next section, I develop a simple model of a democracy with
a government function that can be used to redistribute income. The
model, though highly simplified, illustrates some of the implications of
high and low discoun ters coexisting in the same society, and illustrates
how cooperative solutions can be found to diminish the adverse consequences that arise when high discounters do not save for retirement.

The Public Perspective
If an economy is comprised of either all high discounters or all low
discounters, the results are predictable. Economies dominated by high
discounters will have low levels of investment in human and physical
capital, and thus will be poor. Economies dominated by low discounters
will have high levels of investment in human and physical capital, and
thus will be rich. '2
The interesting question is whether a democratic society with a mix of
high and low discounters can become rich. Individuals with disparate
internal discount rates accumulate different wealth positions. A government can perform a valuable function in this society by establishing property rights and providing police and court functions to ensure stability of
ownership. At the same time, through enactment of comprehensive income or wealth taxes, the government also can "legitimately" tax private
property, or some stream of income derived from property. If high discounters can gain more votes than low discounters, a government can be
transformed from a protector of property rights to a facilitator of transfers from voters who have wealth to those who do not.
The conundrum for this society is simply put: The incentive to save and
invest must be sufficient to encourage low discounters to follow their
natural inclinations to save; yet, the unequal distribution of wealth that
inevitably ensues must be sustainable. In this section, I pursue the nature
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of contracts between high and low discounters that can provide for a selfenforcing equilibrium level of savings and transfers.

Natural Outcomes
Consider a two-person, two-period model. Both individuals have identical attributes except for their internal discount rates.l 3 The low discounter has a zero discount rate. The high discounter has some positive
discount rate, r> > O.
The individuals are born to zero wealth, have no children,l4 and produce output worth $1 in period I when they are young. Owing to a
natural deterioration of productive capacity, both can produce zero in
period 2 when they are old. Death occurs at the end of period 2. Both
individuals have full information. The only reason to save is to support
retirement consumption. In general, savings can generate productivity
improvements, but initially, I assume that the only benefit of savings is
smoothing lifetime consumption; thus, savings are goods set aside in
period 1 for consumption in period 2.
I assume that utility is a log function of consumption that is identical
and separable across individuals and periods. Unless some output is
saved in period 1, consumption and utility in period 2 is zero. When the
individuals live separately, each chooses a savings rate Sj that maximizes
discounted lifetime utility:
(1)

U

= log [1 + C;,l + log [1 + C;.l/ ( 1 + '}),j = L, H,

subject to the constraints:

(2)
where ~, is consumption by the jth individual in period t, and the subscripts Land H denote low and high discounter.
The optimal savings rates for the low and high discounter, SL and SH
respectively, are:

(3)

and

The low discounter equalizes consumption in both periods, and thus has
a 50 percent savings rate. The high discounter consumes output disproportionately in period 1: If his discount rate is at least 100 percent (r= 1),
he consumes all his income in period one and thus saves nothing. In this
case, consumption in period 2 is zero, and thus, the individual is impoverished in old age.
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Mixing High and Low Discounters
I now consider savings decisions when high and low discounters are
mixed in a democracy. For simplicity, I assume that production is unaffected by commingling workers in the same economy. I assume that the
only function of the government is to assign and protect property rights,
and that this function is effected at zero cost. The assignmen t of property
rights depends on groups' abilities to influence voting outcomes.
I employ a model of political economy that mimics the essence of a
government transfer mechanism in a democratic society, but which is
free of unnecessary complexities. The model reflects the principle that
the majority is favored to win each vote but that political outcomes are
uncertain due to other factors (for example, nonlinear utility functions,
asymmetric information, different production functions to influence voting, and so on). Thus, minorities can win voting outcomes, albeit with a
lower probability.
More specifically, I use a simple stochastic voting outcome model. The
"government" is an urn filled with p balls marked Hand I-p balls
marked L. Conflicts between the high and low discounter that cannot be
resolved to their mutual self-interest result in a draw from the urn. Either
individual can make the draw, but there can be only one draw per period.
If an H-ball is drawn, all wealth existing in that period goes to the high
discounter. The all-or-nothing outcome simplifies the problem but is not
critical to the basic thrust of the model.' 5 If an lrball is drawn, all wealth
goes to the low discounter. The outcome is enforced at zero cost. l "

First-Round Effects
Savings patterns that prevail when the high and low discounter live in
separate societies may not be sustainable in a democracy. To illustrate,
assume that the high discounter's discount rate is sufficiently high so that
his savings rate is zero. 17 Thus, the high discounter consumes all his
wealth in period 1, and faces dire prospects in period 2.
In period 2, the high discounter has an incentive to try to take the
low discounter's wealth, and thus to make a draw from the urn: he has
nothing to lose, and some probability p that he can take the low discounter's wealth.
The low discounter must decide whether to make an offer to the high
discounter to dissuade him from playing the lottery. If the low discounter
does nothing, he faces some chance (with probability p) of having zero
consumption in period 2. His alternative is to give some portion, I,ofhis
wealth to the high discounter so as to dissuade the high discounter from
making a draw. The transfer, lSI., must be sufficiently large so that the
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high discounter's utility from certain consumption of this amount is
higher than expected utility of attempting to take the low discounter's
entire wealth:
(4)

log [I + ISJ ""

Plog [1 + SL], 0 < I <

l.

When condition (4) is satisfied, the high discounter has no incentive to
risk losing the transfer amount, IS, in exchange for a chance, p, of obtaining the low discounter's cache SL; and thus, the lottery is not used.

Second-Round Effect
Knowing in period 1 that a hold-up is inevitable, the low discounter does
not save the amount SL. He views the hold-up in period 2 as a de facto tax
on savings, where the tax rate is I. If the low discounter saves the amount
Sv he will consume the amount (1 - I)SL in period 2 and transfer the
amount 1St to support the high discounter's period-2 consumption.
When the low discounter sets his savings rate in period one, he maximizes
his utility in expression (2) subject to the following income constraints:

(5)
The low discounter's optimal savings rate is either positive or zero depending on the tax rate:

(6)

SL*

=

1 - 1/ [2(1- I)] > 0, all 1< Y.!, and

S*=o
I.
,

all I"" Y.!.

If the de facto tax rate is zero (I = 0), the savings rate is 50 percent, which
reflects the low discounter's natural preference. If the tax rate is positive,
the low discounter's savings rate falls. If the tax rate is sufficiently high (1=
If.! in the illustration), the solution degenerates, so that savings are zero:
the low discounter is better off by consuming all his wealth in period 1.
Thus, in this simple model, a necessary condition for positive savings is
that the tax rate is not "too high." In addition, the condition in (4),
which ensures a sustainable income distribution, must be satisfied. In this
model, it turns out that there is no tax rate, I, and consequent savings
rate, SL> that satisfies (4): a period-2 hold-up attempt is inevitable. The
low discounter therefore saves nothing,18 and both the high and low
discounter are impoverished when old.
The solution is not general in the sense thata savings tax always leads to
zero savings. The general result is that systems that depend on a tax on
savings to redistribute income lead to lower savings levels. While the tax is
designed to alleviate a savings deficiency for part of the population, in
fact, it leverages the problem to the entire population: it exacerbates the
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low savings problem. If instead income is redistributed by subsidizing the
high discounter's savings, a cooperative solution can be found that is
characterized by lower transfers, making the low and high discounter
better off.

Subsidizing the High Discounters Savings
I now pursue a savings subsidy solution to the high discounter problem.
In place of penalizing low discounters from following their natural inclination to save, high discounters are offered a subsidy to participate in
savings. Low discounters still award a transfer to high discounters, but
because high discounters save some portion oftheir earnings in response
to the subsidy, the transfer is lower, and the distribution of income during
retirement is mOl-e likely to be sustainable.
To keep the illustration simple, I consider a solution where low discounters subsidize the high discounters. In the model, these types of
individuals are readily identified. In reality, discount rates are not observable, and so the savings subsidy must be offered to everyone, including
low discounters. This complicates the solution, but the overall thrust of
the outcome is the same. 19
Suppose that for each dollar saved by the high discounter, the low discounter adds the amount s. The high discounter chooses a savings rate,
S'/i, that maximizes his lifetime utility in (1) subject to the constraints:

(7)
In general, SH is weakly positive in 5. 20
The low discounter chooses his savings rate, S:', so as to maximize
lifetime utility in (1), subject to his new income constraints. 21 The low
discounter's optimal savings rate is:

(8)

s~ =

y, (1 - s S~).

Equilibrium Conditions
Consider the equilibrium subsidy rate. The low discounter must set the
subsidy rate at least at the minimum that guarantees a sustainable income
distribution, say, s°. In period 2, the high discounter must find it in his
interest not to try to take the low discounter's wealth. 22 Beyond this level,
the equilibrium subsidy rate cannot be determined without putting more
structure on the model. To avoid the complexities of gaming solutions, I
simply assume that the low discounter can choose the subsidy rate so as to
maximize his utility, subject to the period-2 stability condition. 23 Hence,
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TABLE 1 Comparing Outcomes When Savings Are Either Taxed or Subsidized
Consumption
pmodJ

Consumption
pmod2

Categary

LD

HD

LD

HD

LD

HD

LD

HD

LD

Isolation
Democracy:
Taxon
savings
(degenerate
solution)
Democracy:
s'=.5
(savings
subsidy
solution)

.50
1.0

1.0
1.0

.50
0.0

0.0
0.0

.50
0.0

0.0
0.0

.81
.69

.69
.69

.40

.00

.36

.28

.44

.77

.44

.33

.44

.33

.73

.72

.36

.28

Savings

Utility
pmod2

Utility
pmod2

HD

Note: The table shows the consumption rates, savings rates, and utility levels for period I (work period)
and period 2 (retirement period) for low and high discounters. lIlustrative solutions are based on the
assumptions that there is one low discounter (LD) with a zero discount rate, one high discounter
(HD) with a discoum rate equal to 100 percenl (T = I). and a zem productive relurn on savings. The
variable s.. . is the minimum level of the subsidy rate offered by low discounters on each dollar saved by
high discounters that ensures a stable distribution of income.

the low discounter's optimal choice of subsidy rate also is the minimum
necessary to stave off a period-2 hold-up, namely,s". 24
It turns out that when the high discounter's discount I'ate is 100 percent, the value of s" is 50 percent. In this solution, the high discounter
voluntarily saves 22 percent of his income. He receives a subsidy from low
discounters equal to one-half of this amount, so that his savings rate,
gross of the subsidy, is .33, which finances his period-2 consumption.
Notably, the high discounter ends up with higher income (namely, 1.11)
than the low discounter (namely, .89). Clearly. the high discounter is
better off compared to living in isolation, particularly in "old age."
The low discounter is always worse off compared to living in isolation
because some transfer is required to ensure sustainable property rights.
In this sense, there is an inherent cost to being a low discounter. The low
discounter is beller off, however, offering to subsidize the high discounter's savings, compared to a solution that depends on the threat of a holdup in period 2. The gains to a cooperative solution are always positive in
this sense, but the gains are especially large when the hold-up solution
produces a degenerate equilibrium.
Table I summarizes these solutions for the simple case. In the appendix, I consider the results when high discounters have discount rates
different than 100 percent, and when the numbers of high and low dis-
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counters are unequal. The results confirm intuition that solutions with
positive savings are easier to find when low discounters are more numerous than high discounters, and when high discounters are more like
low discoun tel's (that is, when their discount rates are closer to zero than
100 percent).

A Positive Return on Savings
In the above solutions, the value of savings stems solely from diminishing
returns to consumption. A productive return to savings raises the stakes
to finding a cooperative solution.
Suppose that if an individual sacrifices consumption in the amount Sin
period I, he is rewarded with consumption in period 2 in the amount (1 +
i) S, where i is the productive return to savings. 25 For illustration, I set i
equal to 50 percent. I set the high discounter's discount rate to 200
percent to ensure a zero savings rate for this level of return. In isolation,
the high discounter saves nothing, and thus has a zero period-2 consumption. The low discounter naturally saves two-thirds of his period-l output,
and enjoys consumption in period 2 equal to 1.0. 26
I now reconsider the hold-up solutions (tax on low discounters' savings) and the cooperative solutions (subsidy on high discounters' savings). The new solutions are shown in Table 2; they are comparable to
those in Table 1 except national income is a function ofthe savings rate. 27
The first row shows the outcomes when both individuals live in isolation. The second and third row shows the solutions under either the tax
or subsidy approach. Recall that I award all the bargaining power to the
low discounter. Thus, the low discounter chooses the tax or subsidy rate
that maximizes his utility, subject to the condition that the period-2
wealth distribution is sustainable. In this solution, the savings tax rate is
45 percent (1* = .45). The low discounter saves 39 percent of his period-l
product and transfers 18 percent of his income to the high discounter.
Alternatively, in the savings subsidy solution, the equilibrium subsidy
rate is 80 percent (s' = .8). The high discounter saves 22 percent of his
income and, inclusive of his subsidy, has gross savings of 38 percent of
income. The low discounter sets his own savings rate to 56 percent of
income. Per capita savings per capita are twice as high as the in the tax
solution; per capita income increases from 1.10 to 1.23. Compared to a
redistributive tax on savings, the low discounter clearly is better off offering to subsidize high discounters' savings.
Figure 1 shows how the results change with different proportions of
high and low discounters. (Details are presented in the appendix.) The
figure shows per capita savings and output under the tax and subsidy
solutions. There are two striking features of the results.
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TABLE 2 Tax and Subsidy Solutions, Given a Positive Return on Savings

Category
Isolation
outcome
Democratic
solution
L=H=1

Taxi
subsidy
solution

[JJ

Utility
HD

Outfrut
pl?I"
capita

Savings
pel"
capita

.00

.98

.69

1.16

.33

.18

.75

.77

1.10

.20

.16

.86

.73

1.24

.48

Savings
W

Savings
HD

Trans!er
perW

.66

.00

t*

= .45

.39

s"

= .80

.58

.22

Utility

Note: f. is the number of low discounters and H is the number of high discounters. The high discounter (HD) has a 200 percent discount rate (I" = 2), the low discounter (LD) has a zero discount
rate, and the return on savings is50 percent (i::: .5). The variable t* denotes the minimum tax rale on
the low discounter's savings that ensures a stable distribution of income; the V'driable SO is the minimum level of the subsidy rate offered by low discounters on each dollar saved by high discounters that
ensures a stable distribution of income. Lifetime utility is discounted to period] using each individual's discount rate.

First, the equilibrium outcomes depend importantly on the share of
low and high discounters in the population. If there are "too many" high
discounters, no interior solution exists: low and high discounters consume all their output in period 1 and are impoverished in period 2. In the
illustration, the critical low discounter share is approximately 30 percent.
Iflow discounters are a smaller minority, savings are zero and per capita
consumption in period 1 is 1.
As low discounters increase their proportions beyond this level, interior solutions are feasible, which dramatically affect per capita outpUt. 28
Per capita income increases with the proportion oflow discounters in the
economy.
Second, per capita savings and income are always higher using a subsidy solution to the high discounter problem rather than a tax solution.
Solutions that encourage high discounters to act more like low discounters lead to more savings and output than solutions that discourage low
discounters from following their natural inclinations to save. The difference in these outcomes is always positive, but is largest when low discounters do not dominate the population.
Figure 2 shows high and low discoullte.-s' utility levels under the savings
subsidy solutions. Lifetime utility is discounted to period 1 using each
individual's personal discount rate. High discounters do not attach a high
value to the prospect of higher period-2 consumption, and thus their
lifetime utility is dominated by consideration of period-l consumption.
Viewed from the perspective of period 2, however, high discounters'
utility is substantially higher in the cooperative solution. Compared to
zero savings and zero period-2 consumption in the isolated solution, high
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Per capita income and savings
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Figure 1. How per capita income and saving vary with the share of low discounters. High discounter's discount rate is taken as 2.0%, low discounter's as 0.5%.

discounters enjoy higher consumption in old age. In return for generating relatively high period-2 consumption for high discounters, low discounters enjoy a relatively high (and sustainable) consumption level in
period 2.
Starting from equilibrium solutions when low discounters dominate
the population, high discoun ters clearly are better off if they can increase
their relative numbers in the population. Their higher share gives them
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Figure 2. How utility levels vary with the share of low discounters (assuming a
savings subsidy cooperative solution). Utility = log (I + C1 ) + log (1 + C2 ) / (1 + r);
r= 0 for LD and 2.0 for HD; return on savings is 0.5.

more leverage 10 collect transfers from low discounters who attach substantial value to ensuring a sustainable income distribution. As their
numbers grow beyond some critical point, however, there are "too few"
low discounters to support economical transfers, and a degenerate equilibrium is inevitable.
Low discounters are always somewhat worse off compared to a world in
which they dominate the population. But as long as there are not "too
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many" high discounters, low discounters can have a high standard of
living when young and old that is not threatened by an unsustainable
distribution of wealth.

Conclusion
When low discounters are mixed with high discounters, different wealth
positions develop, giving rise to a "high discounter problem:" low discounters accumulate wealth, and high discounters do not. The ability of
high discoun ters to vote to effect a redistribution of income gives rise to
prospects for a hold-up in later periods. To thwart the hold-up, low discounters can "share" their wealth - that is, incur a wealth tax to redistribute income to high discounters. This outcome is problematic because the threat of a redistributive tax discourages savings. In effect, the
defacto tax on savings encourages low discounters to act more like high
discounters.
A more efficient solution arises iflow discounters can alter the form of
a transfer from a tax on their savings to a subsidy on high discounters'
savings. The subsidy encourages some savings by high discounters and
gives them a stake in the economy's wealth position. In effect, high discounters are encouraged to act more like low discounters. Per capita
savings and output increase, partly financing the transfers to high discounters. Old age consumption is higher for both low and high discounters compared to solutions that depend on a hold-up potential.
The model has implications for tax, regulatory, and national retirement policy. Existing pension policy is partly driven by an attempt to
expand coverage (for example, vesting rules, anti-discrimination rules,
and participation rules). The model suggests that this approach is unlikely to be fruitful: high discounters have a natural tendency to avoid
firms that defer part of compensation; and firms that offer pensions
more likely seek to hire and retain low discounters. In this sense, profitmaximizing incentives in the market work in tandem with high discounters' natural aversion to save. The rise of 401 (k) plans further diminish
the prospects for forced coverage in the private market.
The thrust of the comprehensive income tax in the United States essentially conforms to the tax solution discussed above. The general rule
in the tax system is that income diverted to savings are "doubly taxed";
effectively income devoted to savings is taxed at higher rates than income
devoted to immediate consumption. 29 By penalizing savings, the tax code
discourages low discounters from following their natural inclination and
redoubles high discounters' natural aversion to savings.
Exceptions in the tax code are made for pension vehicles, but even
here, defined contribution plans are treated more favorably than de-
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fined benefit plans. The distortion occurs because the latter plans are
denied the opportunity to fund their plans at the same level as defined
contribution plans. 30 Moreover, so-called antidiscrimination rules in the
Internal Revenue Code are chiefly designed to prevent highly-paid workers from saving "too much," rather than toward encouraging more participation by those otherwise not inclined to save.
An unfunded social security system such as that used in the United
States has some of the elements suggested by a cooperative solution:
there is a requirement to participate in the program, but formulas are set
up to subsidize those least likely to voluntarily accumulate wealth for old
age. The same principles could apply to a funded system, whether defined benefit or defined contribution. Nevertheless, the social security
system penalizes those who save and rewards those who save little or
nothing for old ageY In a broad sense, it is far more likely that a consumption tax approach -which eliminates the special added taxes on
savings - combined with more subsidies to some levels of savings for retirement, would generate higher national income, more resources for
consumption in old age, and a more sustainable distribution of income
across society.

Appendix: The Role of the High/Low Discounter Mix
and Discount Rate Spreads
The chapter considers a case where there is one low discounter and one
high discounter. When the proportions of high and low discounters vary,
the transfers from each low discounter are aggregated and spread over
the population of high discounters. As such, the conditions for a sustainable income distribution are altered, and this is the subject of this appendix. Here, I recalculate the minimum tax rates and subsidy rates that
generate a sustainable equilibrium on the assumption that the probability of winning a voting outcome is proportional to high discounters'
proportion in the voting pool (p= HI [L + H]).32

No Productive Return to Savings
Appendix Table 1 shows the outcomes for the low and high discounter
under several conditions when the productive return savings is zero. The
top portion of the table shows the expected outcome when each individual lives in isolation. The bottom portion shows various outcomes in a
democratic society. The values in the second column are the minimum
tax rate (t*) and minimum subsidy rate (so) that generate a sustainable
income distribution under either a savings tax approach or a subsidy
approach.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 Comparing Savings and Tax Outcomes When There Is No
Productive Return on Savings
Categary

Tax/subsidy
solution

Isolation
outcome
Democratic
outcomes

L=I
H=1
r= I

Savings
W

Savings
HD

Transfer
perW

Utility
W

Utility
HD

.50

.00

.00

.81

.69

.00

.69

.69

.11

.07

.73
.75

.72
.79

t* = ds

.00

.5

.44
.37

.22

.48
.42

.21

.03
.06

.79
.76

.71
.74

.47
.00

.30

.06

.77

.73

.17

.14

.72

.71

SO

=

t* = .2

L=3
SO

= .45

t* = .15

r = Y2
SO

=.2

t* = ds

H=2
= ds

t* = ds

.00
.00

= .8

.43

SO

r=lY2
SO

Note: The table shows the savings rates, utility levels, and transfers from low to high discounters, assuming alternatively that high discounters' retirement savings are enhanced by
either a tax on low discounters' savings or a subsidy on high discounters' savings. In either
case, the tax and subsidy rates are chosen to maximize low discounters' utility, subject to a
stable distribution of income. L is the number oflaw discounters; H is the number of high
discounters. The high discounter (HD) has a discount rate equal to r> 0, the low discounter (LD) has a zero discount rate, and the productive return on savings is zero. The
variable t* denotes the minimum tax rate on the low discounter's savings that ensures a
sustainable income distribution. The variable 5" is the minimum level of the subsidy rate
offered by low discounters on each dollar saved by high discounters that ensures a sustainable distribution of income. Lifetime utility is discounted to period 1 using either the low or
high discounter's discount rate. as appropriate. The notation ds depicts a degenerate
solution: There is no tax (or subsidy) solution that makes low discounters better off, and
ensures a sustainable income distribution. Thus, overall savings are zero.

The other columns report the savings rates of the low and high discounter, the amount transferred from the low discounter to the high
discounter, and the discounted utilities for both individuals under these
solutions, evalu'lted in period 1. In the cooperative solution, the transfer
is the matching amount, and thus is part of aggregate savings.
The first row of democratic outcomes shows the solution discussed in
the text when there is one low discounter with discount rate zero and one
high discounter with a discount rate o£1OO percent (r= 1). The coopera-
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tive solution is clearly superior to the potential for a period-2 hold-up.
The subsidy rate is set to 50 percent. The high discounter voluntarily
saves 22 percent of his income. The low discounter has a net savings rate
of 44 percent, and transfers 11 percent of his income to the high discounter. Aggregate savings in this solution is 38 percent of aggregate
period-l output, which exceeds the solution where individuals live in
isolation. 33 Both individuals are better off compared to the hold-up solution; the high discounter is better off in the democracy (he consumes
55.5 percent oftotal output, inclusive of the transfer).
Moving down the table, the solutions show that low discounters tend to
fare better, the higher their proportions in the population, and the more
closely high discounters resemble low discounters in the level of their
discount rates. The second and third democratic solutions reflect situations where low discounters are three times more numerous than high
discounters; and high discounters have a more modest discount rate
(namely Y2 instead of 1).
In the last two rows, I show solutions less favorable to low discounters,
namely, when high discounters are twice as numerous as low discounters,
and when high discounters have an even higher discount rate (r= 1.5 in
place of r= 1). Except for a subsidy solution in the latter case, these cases
are dominated by degenerate solutions (that is, there is no positive savings rate that makes low discounters better off and ensures a sustainable
income distribution).

Productive Return to Savings
Appendix Table 2 shows similar solutions when the productive return on
savings is 50 percent and the high discounter's discount rate is 200 percent. The solutions are reported for various portions of the population
that are low discounters (where a denotes the low discounter percent of
total population).
The results show that when high discounters outnumber low discounters two to one (a = .33), the savings rate is negligible in a tax solution. But
the savings subsidy solution produces a savings rate of approximately 40
percent. Compared to the tax solution, per capita income increases from
1.01 to 1.21. Finding conditions that generate a sustainable solution with
positive savings is an important determinant of income and utility in the
model.
Per capita income increases with the proportions of low discoun ters. If
there are two low discounters for every three high discounters, interior
solutions can be found for both the savings tax and subsidy approaches,
but the subsidy outcome produces higher savings and per capita income.
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A!'PENUIX TABLE 2 Tax and Subsidy Solutions When There Is a Positive Return on Savings
Tax/subsidy
solution

Savings

Categury

LD

Savings
liD

Isolation
outcome
Democratic
outcomes

.66

.00

Transfer Utility
perW
W

Utility
liD

Output
per
capita

per

Savings

.00

.98

.69

1.16

.33

.04

.70

.69

1.01

.00

capita

= .65

.05

= .75
= .60

.50
.17

.21

.32
.10

.72
.71

.73
.74

1.21
1.03

.41
.07

= .75
= .45

.54
.39

.21

.24
.18

.79
.75

.73
.77

1.22
1.10

.44
.20

= .75
= .30

.58
.52

.22

.16
.16

.86
.83

.73
.79

1.24
1.16

.48
.31

= .70
= .25

.61
.55

.21

.10
.14

.91
.85

.73

.81

1.26
1.18

.51
.37

= .65
= .15

.63
.61

.20

t*

.06
.09

.93
.90

.72
.81

1.26
1.23

.53
.45

S°

= .60

.65

.19

.04

.95

.72

1.28

.56

t*

a= .33
S°

t*
a = .4
S°

t*
a= .5
S°

t*

a= .6
S°

t*
a= .67
S°

a= .75
Note: The lable shows the solutions when a savings tax or savings subsidy approach is used to address

the high discounter problem. a is the percent of low discounters in the population

(a

= L/

(L + H).

where L is the number of low discounters and H is the number of high discounters. The high

discounter (HD) has a 200 percent discount rate

(r =

2), the low discounter

(LD)

has a zero discount

rate, and the return on savings is 50 percent (i = .5). The variable t* denotes the tax rate on the low
discounter's savings that generates a sustainable income distribution. The variable SU is the level of the

subsidy rate offered by low discounters on each dollar saved by high discounters that ensures a
sustainable distribution of income. Lifetime utility is discounted to period one using the individual's
internal discount rate.

The difference between the tax and subsidy outcomes is greater, the
more the population is dominated by high discounters.
The views expressed in this chapter do not reflect the official views of
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Notes

1. The individual is indifferent between $100 now and $100 + x in one year
when $100 = ($100 + x)/(I + r) where r is the individual's discount rate. Thus.
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the higher that x needs to be to create the equality, the higher must be the
discount rate he attaches to payoffs one year into the future.
2. The implications of heterogeneous savings propensities on wealth accumulation can be found in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and Engen and Gale (1996).
Savings propensities also can differ across workers owing to different amounts of
information about the consequences of sa\~ngs behavior (Bernheim and Garrett
1995) .
3. For example, the firm may wish to use defined benefit pension plans to
discourage quitting and to encourage earlier retirement.
4. This idea is developed more fully in Ippolito (1995).
5. The argument makes the assumption that capital markets are imperfect, that
high discounters cannot borrow against the promise of higher income in the
future. As long as borrowing is not possible, productivity decisions will be influenced by their internal discount rate.
6. Some low discounters may not have opportunities to pursue education; some
high discounters may attain education because it is financed by parents, and so on.
7. In the United States, cliff vesting can be no more than five years. While fiveyear cliff vesting is almost universal in defined benefit plans, it typically is much
shoner in defined contribution plans. The firm can and sometimes does use
immediate vesting.
8. If the individual does not roll over the monies, he pays an excise tax of 10
percent and takes the lump sum into immediate taxable income.
9. The firm does not use a defined benefit plan because it does not find a
deferred wage scheme to be economic; that is, the benefits of deferred wages are
outweighed by the indenture premium.
10. For example, suppose that the high discounters's imperfect information is
described by a perceived alternative wage in a no-monitoring firm of 1 + e, where e
is an error term with mean zero. For high discounters with large, negative values
of e, the perceived alternative wage is less than the wage in the monitoring firm,
and thus, the gains from entering the monitoring firm are positive: ill = Wo - S [1 +e] > O,forsome e<O.
11. The full tax advantages of pensions are afforded only in plans offered
by firms. Individual retirement accounts permit only $2,000 per annum in
contributions.
12. The mobility of physical capital from low- to high-discount economies is
hampered because property rights are more tenuous in economies dominated by
high discounters. That is to say, high discounters perceive the immediate gains of
holding up low discounters without appreciating the long-run consequences on
lower future capital investment. Thus, if rich nations make specialized investments in economies dominated by high discounters, they face the risk that their
capital will be expropriated.
13. I later expand the results to allow varying proportions of high and low
discounters.
14. Thus, there are no prospects for intergenerational transfers.
15. The qualitative results are similar ifa significant portion of wealth is transfer
upon winning a draw.
16. In reality, government outcomes need not be all or nothing, and production functions for influencing outcomes generally goes beyond a random draw
concept (Becker 1983; Peltzman 1976).
17. In terms of condition 4, zero savings occur if the discount rate is 100
percent or higher.

270

Savings Propensities and National Retirement Policy

18. To be complete, 1 need to show that the low discounter prefers certain
consumption of all his income in period I compared to saving some portion to be
contested in a period-2 lottery: log(2) > log(2-S/J + (l-p)log(l+S/). In fact,
this condition is satisfied.
19. If the subsidy is made available to all, then low discounters also respond to
the incentive, creating some transfers from low discounters to themselves, and
creating an inefficiency from encouraging low discounters to "too much" savings.
In practice, the solution might involve a subsidy over some initial levels of savings,
diminishing at higher levels of savings.
20. Maximizing (I) subject to the constraints in (7), the high discounter's
optimal savings is:
S!'J= (2z-I)/(1 +s+z),wherez= (l+s)/(I+r),

and thus consumption in period 2 is
C;;'= S!'J [I +s].

Consider the case when the high discounter's discount rate is 100 percent (r=I).
Without the subsidy (s=O), the high discounter saves nothing. If the discount rate
is sufficiently high, the high discounter will maintain zero savings within the
range of subsidy rates that makes the low discounter better off.
21. These constraints are: CLI = I - SI. - SSH: and C/., = SL'
22. The minimum value of s that guarantees stability is s': log [1 + (I +s') S!'J] = P
log [I + (l+s')S;',+ Sn.
23. See note 22.
24. I also make this assumption in developing savings tax solutions that compete with the subsidy scheme.
25. For example, suppose work in period 1 takes the form of expending effort
to search for food. Savings in this simple model might take the form of using some
period-l time to develop plants that yield food without an expenditure of effort.
This process may yield a superior solution compared to spending all of period 1
collecting food for both periods.
26. The new income constraints are:

Maximizing (l) subject to these constraint gives the optimum savings rates:
~=

[2(l+i) - (l+'j)]/(I+i)(2+'j),j=L, H.

27. In the case of the tax solution, the income constraints for the low discounter are:

and thus the low discounter's savings rate is:
SL* = 1- 1/2d.

The stability condition is the same as expression (4) except that SL* is replaced by
(I+i)S/*'
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In the case of the savings subsidy to the high discounter, the high discounter's
constraints are

Cm = I - SH and Cm = SII 1\, where 1\ = (I+i) (I +5),
where s is the per dollar subsidy offered by low discounters to high discounters'
savings. Thus, the high discounter's optimal savings rate is:
Sli= [21\ - (1 + r)]/A(2 + r).

The low discounter faces the constraints:

where 5 is the subsidy rate offered to high discounter's savings. Thus, the low
discounter's optimal savings rate is
S/= [(I + i)(2 - 5SH ) - 1]/2(1 + i).

The stability condition is the same as in footnote 19 except that ~*, j =L, Hare
replaced by (l+i)S/.
28. In this model, when the return on savings is .5 and the high discounter's
discount rate is 200 percent, equilibrium degenerates when the share of low
discounters in the population falls below 30 percent of the population.
29. The double tax refers to the income tax applied at the time wages are
earned; then again as the individual tries to save these monies to finance future
consumption. See Ippolito (1990) for a fuller discussion.
30. A special full funding limit was enacted in 1987 that sharply limits funding
of defined benefit pensions, particularly those that have lots of workers and few
retirees. See Ippolito (1990).
31. These rules include special taxes on social security benefits to individuals
who have other sources of income during retirement, the availability of nursing
home care to those without assets, and so on. A menu of reforms for social
security and pensions along the lines discussed here are provided in Ippolito
(forthcoming) .
32. In the tax solution, the expression for the low discounter's savings choice is
the same, given some tax rate t against savings (see expression 6). The high
discounter's period-2 consumption becomes:
C",= (I+i) [ltSI+SII ], I=LIH.

Thus, the period-2 stability condition is
log [1 + (l+i) (I t S/+ SII)]

2:

Plog [1 + (l+i) (I Sl+ SII)], p= HI (L+H).

In the subsidy solution, for any subsidy rate, s, high discounters solve for the
same level of savings. Since the subsidy amount to H high discounters, HsSII, is
spread across L low discounters, the optimum savings rate for each low discounter
is
SL= [(1 + i)(2 - sSHIl) - 1]12 (1 + i).
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The period-2 stability condition becomes:

33. Savings are .44 for the low discounter, .22 for the high discounter, plus the
transfer amount of .11; since total output is 2 then (.44 + .33 + .11) /2= .38.
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